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We develop and test measures of the horizon of firm uncertainty and of the horizon of managers’ 
corporate disclosures.  The measures exploit information in the term structure of implied equity 
volatilities to gauge the relative extent to which the information underlying securities prices 
reflects long-term versus short-term uncertainty.  We find that the horizon of firm uncertainty 
measure is associated with variables that are likely to capture the extent to which firms’ business 
models result in differing degrees of uncertainty about the long-term versus the short-term.  The 
horizon of managers’ corporate disclosures measure allows us to characterize managers’ 
disclosures in terms of whether they provide information about long-term business strategies or 
are more oriented towards short-term operating results.  We find that earnings announcements 
containing management forecasts have shorter disclosure horizons than earnings announcements 
not containing management forecasts.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, we develop and test measures of the horizon of firm uncertainty and of the 
horizon of managers’ corporate disclosures.  These measures exploit information in the term 
structure of implied equity volatilities to gauge the relative extent to which the information 
underlying securities prices reflects long-term versus short-term uncertainty about firm value.  
The uncertainty about firm value reflected in the term structure of implied volatilities captures 
the precision of investor information over various horizons.  We expect the precision of investor 
information over various horizons to vary as a function of firm characteristics and changes in it 
around earnings announcements to reflect the nature of the information released.  Thus, 
examining the term structure of implied volatilities allows us to characterize management 
disclosures in terms of whether they provide information to investors about long-term business 
strategies or are more oriented towards short-term operating results. 
Bushee and Noe (2000) suggest that managers, through their disclosures, can affect their 
firm’s investor base (i.e., the composition of short-term and long-term investors that trade their 
firm’s stock).  Managers care about their firm’s investor base because short-term investors 
increase volatility (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Bushee, 2004).  This increase in volatility increases 
the chances of large stock price declines.  Poor stock price performance can hurt the manager’s 
reputation and increase the probability that the manager gets terminated (e.g., Warner et al., 
1988).  Increased volatility can also increase the perceived riskiness of the firm and result in an 
increase in the firm’s cost of capital (Froot et al., 1992).  To the extent that relatively long-term 
disclosures repel short-term investors and attract long-term investors, managers can reduce the 
capital market pressure for short-term results, thus increasing the manager’s ability to take on 
long-term value maximizing projects (Bushee, 1998, 2001, 2004).      
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Measuring the horizon of a manager’s disclosures is complicated by the fact that the 
horizon over which investors’ expectations change is not directly observable.  Many papers 
examine the informativeness of various corporate disclosures, which is typically derived from 
the stock market reaction to the disclosure.1  However, the stock market reaction aggregates 
long-term and short-term changes in investors’ expectations and, therefore, is not useful in 
distinguishing between the short-term and the long-term.  On the other hand, investors’ 
uncertainty about firm value is also affected by corporate disclosures and can be measured over 
various horizons.  Therefore, we examine the horizon of corporate disclosures by utilizing the 
duration of different implied volatilities from exchange-traded options to measure uncertainty 
about firm value over multiple horizons.2  In other words, we exploit observable standardized 
implied equity volatilities of different durations to estimate the relative amount of short-term 
versus long-term information, or the horizon of a firm’s disclosure.    
Our horizon measure captures the extent to which a firm faces relatively short-term 
versus long-term uncertainty.  To calculate this measure, we first compute forward implied 
volatilities over each of the next four 91-day periods within a broader 365-day horizon.3  We 
then measure the proportion of the 365-day (the longer-term period) implied volatility expected 
to occur within each of the four 91-day periods (the interim periods) and use these proportions to 
weight the horizon of the corresponding 91-day period to arrive at a volatility-weighted duration, 
                                                 
1 Representative studies include Ball and Brown (1968), Ball and Shivakumar (2008), Foster (1973),  Patell (1976), 
Penman (1980), Ajinkya and Gift (1984), Waymire (1984), Baginski et al. (1993),  Skinner (1994), Miller (2002), 
Hutton et al.(2003), Milian (2010), Griffin (2003), Li and Ramesh (2009), Lerman and Livnat (2009), Bryan (1997), 
and Brown and Tucker (2011).   
2 Implied volatility is the market’s expectation of the average stock return volatility over the duration of the option 
contract and is equal to the volatility implied by the option’s price and an option pricing model such as the Black-
Scholes model or the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial tree model. 
3 Implied volatility refers to the expected volatility over the life of the option contract, while forward implied 
volatility refers to the expected volatility over a sub-period of the option contract that starts after the beginning of 
the option contract.  
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or horizon.  For example, if the forward volatilities are constant over the interim periods, then the 
volatility-weighted duration, or Horizon, equals 180 days (approximately equal to ½×365 days).  
If the earlier 91-day periods have larger (smaller) implied volatilities than the later 91-day 
periods, then Horizon is less (greater) than 180 days.  In other words, smaller values of Horizon 
indicate that underlying security prices reflect relatively more short-term uncertainty about firm 
value, while larger values of Horizon indicate relatively more long-term uncertainty.  Thus, 
Horizon measures how total uncertainty is distributed through time and will capture whether firm 
information reflects relatively more long-term or short-term uncertainty.4 
We validate the Horizon measure by regressing Horizon on variables that are likely to 
capture the extent to which a firm’s business model results in differing degrees of long-term 
versus short-term uncertainty about firm value.  In the cross-section, we find that Horizon 
increases in a firm’s R&D intensity and growth opportunities, which is consistent with the long-
term nature of these types of activities.  In addition, we find that firms in industries with longer 
product development cycles (e.g., aircraft) have relatively more long-term uncertainty than firms 
in industries with shorter product development cycles (e.g., steel).  In contrast, firms reporting 
accounting losses face relatively more short-term uncertainty.  At the macroeconomic level, we 
find that firms face relatively more short-term uncertainty at the time of large, negative market-
wide shocks (e.g., during the financial crisis of 2008).  The higher short-term uncertainty for loss 
firms and at the time of large, negative market-wide shocks is consistent with the relatively 
short-term nature of distress and liquidity issues.  Also, we document that large firms and stable 
                                                 
4 In this paper, we focus on the relative amount of “short-term” versus “long-term” nature of information within the 
context of a 365-day time period. We acknowledge that variation in uncertainty about firm value that extends well 
beyond our 365-day window is also of considerable interest.  However, our study is constrained to a 365-day 
window because implied volatilities any further into the future are generally not available. Implied equity volatilities 
up to 730 days are available for a very limited number of firm-years.  In untabulated tests, we find that the 730-day 
Horizon is 85% correlated with our 365-day Horizon for this limited sample. This provides prima facie evidence 
that the 365-day Horizon measure used throughout this study captures a significant portion of the distribution of 
information uncertainty over relatively longer time horizons.  
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firms (i.e., low volatility over the past year) are associated with relatively less short-term 
uncertainty.  Finally, we document that Horizon is positively associated with the dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts for the next fiscal year relative to the dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for the current fiscal year (i.e., a measure of the term structure of the dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts), which provides additional validation for our Horizon measure.  
Overall, our analysis suggests that the term structure of implied equity volatility can be used to 
extract important information about the relative amount of short-term versus long-term 
uncertainty that firms face and how investors react to this information around earnings 
announcement disclosures. 
To assess a firms’ Disclosure Horizon, we next examine changes in implied volatilities of 
various durations around corporate disclosures.5  A firm’s Disclosure Horizon captures the 
relative proportions of the precision of short-term versus long-term information about 
uncertainty conveyed by the firm’s disclosures.6  Using this measure, we address the popular 
debate about whether the issuance of earnings guidance is associated with a short-term focus.  
Given that a large proportion of earnings guidance occurs at earnings announcements, we 
                                                 
5 Implied volatilities are available on a daily basis which makes them useful for studying information releases such 
as earnings announcements, management forecasts, and conference calls.   
6 Our measure of Disclosure Horizon measures how changes in investors’ expectations of firm uncertainty are 
relatively distributed through time (i.e., short-term vs. long-term), which is very distinct from changes to the 
magnitude of uncertainty, which was examined in Rogers et. al (2009).  To illustrate this important difference, 
consider two firms, A and B, for which investors form expectations about firm uncertainty over two horizons, short-
term (e.g., first 6 month period) and long-term (e.g., second 6 month period).  Assume that investors’ expectations 
over firm A’s uncertainty is 0.60 over both the short-term period and the long-term period, but their expectations 
over firm B’s uncertainty is 0.20 and 0.30 over the short-term period and long-term period, respectively.   In this 
case, the magnitude of firm A’s uncertainty is higher on average and in both periods than the magnitude of firm B’s 
uncertainty.  However, firm B would have a higher Disclosure Horizon (i.e., relatively more long-term) than firm A 
because relatively more of firm B’s total uncertainty is concentrated in the long-term period (i.e., 0.30/(0.30 + 0.20) 
= 60%) compared to the concentration of firm A’s total uncertainty in the long-term period (i.e., 0.60/(0.60 + 0.60) = 
50%).  Thus, while the magnitude and Horizon measures we consider in this paper are both important dimensions of 
firm uncertainty to understand, the two measures do not capture the same phenomenon (as illustrated by opposing 
classifications in the above example).  While prior research, such as Rogers et. al (2009), has examined the effect of 
firm disclosures on the magnitude of uncertainty, the focus of our paper is on the effect on the temporal distribution 
(or horizon) of uncertainty, irrespective of the magnitude of that uncertainty. 
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examine whether bundled earnings announcements (i.e., earnings announcements containing 
management forecasts or earnings guidance) are relatively more short-term or long-term 
information events than non-bundled earnings announcements (earnings announcements not 
containing management forecasts or earnings guidance).   
Our regression analysis suggests that, on average, bundled earnings announcements are 
associated with shorter disclosure horizons than non-bundled earnings announcements.  In 
addition, there is relatively greater open interest in short-term options prior to bundled earnings 
announcements.  This is consistent with bundled earnings announcements containing a larger 
proportion of short-term information than non-bundled earnings announcements and supports the 
view that issuing earnings guidance is associated with a greater short-term focus by managers 
and investors.  We also find that earnings announcement conference calls are associated with 
longer disclosure horizons for firms that issue earnings guidance.  These results indicate that 
when a firm has both an earnings forecast and conference call, the short-term nature of the 
forecast is at least partially offset by other relatively long-term information contained in the 
conference call. In other words, hosting a conference call can help to reduce some of the short-
term focus created by an earnings forecast. This paper makes several contributions.  First, this is 
the first examination of the term structure of implied equity volatilities on a large scale at the 
firm level.  Second, the Horizon measure allows future research to distinguish between firms 
facing relatively short-term uncertainty and firms facing relatively long-term uncertainty.  Third, 
the Disclosure Horizon measure allows researchers to determine the relative amounts of short-
term and long-term information in a disclosure.  This will potentially further our understanding 
of the nature of the information in various disclosures and how this attribute of disclosure differs 
across manager and/or firm characteristics.  Fourth, we introduce the use of the relative amount 
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of open interest in short-term options as a proxy for the amount of transient investors in a stock.  
Fifth, we provide empirical evidence that the provision of earnings guidance tends to be 
associated with a greater short-term focus by managers and investors.  Sixth, our finding that 
earnings conference calls reduce the short-term focus of bundled earnings announcements 
suggests that conference calls are a useful voluntary disclosure medium for conveying longer-
term information.   
Section II discusses prior research.  Section III discusses how we measure horizon and 
disclosure horizon.  Section IV develops empirical predictions.  Section V describes our sample 
and data.  Section VI reports our empirical results.  Section VII concludes. 
 
II. PRIOR RESEARCH 
Disclosure and Uncertainty 
 
Prior research on the relation between disclosure and uncertainty focuses on how 
disclosure affects the magnitude of uncertainty.  Patell and Wolfson (1979, 1981) and Isakov and 
Perignon (2001) find that implied volatility (a proxy for uncertainty) increases before a firm’s 
earnings announcement and decreases following the announcement.  Subramanyam et et al. 
(2005) present a model where large earnings surprises (both positive and negative) increase 
uncertainty.  Clement et al. (2003) find that confirming management forecasts do not affect the 
mean of the consensus analyst forecast but do reduce the dispersion of the analyst estimates.  Ng 
et al. (2009) present a model and empirical evidence in which firms that report poor performance 
tend to experience increases in future earnings volatility.  Rogers et al. (2009) examine how 
management forecasts affect uncertainty over various option durations.  They find that 
management forecasts, on average, increase uncertainty over various option durations (i.e., 
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implied volatility increases in the days around the forecasts).  Kim et al. (2010) find that there is 
a decrease in management forecasts during periods of high uncertainty.  In contrast to these 
papers on the relation between disclosure and the magnitude of uncertainty, our paper abstracts 
away from the magnitude of uncertainty and focuses on how the relative duration or horizon of 
uncertainty is affected by disclosure.  By analyzing changes in a firm’s term structure of implied 
volatility, our goal is to infer the relative amounts of short-term and long-term information in a 
firm’s disclosure.7     
Short-term Focus and the Investor Base 
The importance of the distinction between long-term and short-term information is most 
relevant to the literature on managers’ horizon and the investor base.  In a survey of managers, 
Graham et al. (2005) find that a surprisingly large number of managers admit to being willing to 
sacrifice long-run value to meet short-term earnings targets.  Bhojraj and Libby (2005), in an 
experimental setting, find that managers’ short-term focus is increasing in capital market 
pressure.  They conclude that more frequent disclosure could increase managers’ short-term 
focus in the presence of significant stock market pressure.  Consistent with the results of this 
experiment, Gigler et al. (2009) present a model where frequent short-term disclosures result in 
managers’ short-term focus due to information imperfections in the market between managers 
and investors.   They show that frequent reporting or forecasting of results increases the 
premature evaluation of projects with values that are only determined in the long-term, which 
causes managers to avoid these projects in favor of ones that generate short-term results.  Bushee 
and Noe (2000) find that disclosures that attract short-term investors increase volatility.  
                                                 
7 Van Buskirk (2011) examines the volatility skew dimension of the implied volatility surface and finds that high 
volatility skew predicts negative price jumps at earnings announcements, but not outside of earnings periods.   Also, 
see Xing et al. (2010) and Jin et al. (2012). 
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Managers care about their firm’s investor base because short-term investors increase volatility 
which can increase the firm’s cost of capital, increase pressure for short-term results, and reduce 
the manager’s job security.  Managers, therefore, aim to build a dedicated investor base.   
Concerns over managerial short-termism and disclosure are not limited to academic 
arenas.  In his 2000 letter to shareholders, Warren Buffett stressed the importance of long-term 
strategy and not quarterly earnings.  At the time Google went public, the founders established a 
disclosure policy of not providing earnings guidance due to the company’s long-term focus.  
Likewise, several firms that had previously provided earnings guidance have stopped in order to 
keep their focus on the long-term (Deloitte 2012).  A panel of the CFA Centre for Financial 
Market Integrity and the Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics recommended the 
abolition of quarterly guidance and a transition to “higher quality, long term, fundamental 
guidance practices” (Krehmeyer et al., 2006).8  In addition, a focus on short-term earnings is the 
second most important cost of providing guidance according to a 2006 McKinsey survey of 
CFOs, CEOs, and board members of publicly held companies (Hsieh et al., 2006).9  While these 
practitioners may strongly believe in the short-term nature of earnings guidance, there is no 
direct empirical evidence on how capital market participants interpret whether these disclosures 
provided relatively short-term or long-term information about firm value.  Our study fills this 
void.   
Distinguishing between short-term and long-term information of corporate disclosures 
from investors’ perspectives is central to the debate about firms’ disclosure practices (e.g., 
mandatory quarterly reporting, voluntary earnings forecasts), manager’s horizon, and the firm’s 
investor base.  While the debate regarding earnings guidance goes beyond the nature of the 
                                                 
8 Similar recommendations are made in Schacht et al. (2007). 
9 The survey finds the most important cost is management’s time. 
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information in earnings guidance, that is whether the assumed short-term nature of earnings 
guidance affects managers’ investment decisions, addressing whether or not earnings guidance is 
associated with short-term information is an important precondition in this debate and an 
empirical question that has not been answered.10  The aim of our study is to test whether or not 
this is the case by developing a measure to assess the relative amounts on short-term and long-
term information in a disclosure from the capital market’s perspective.  
 
III. MEASURING HORIZON AND DISCLOSURE HORIZON 
In this section, we provide details about the calculations of the Horizon and Disclosure 
Horizon measures. 
Horizon 
To analyze the information in the term structure of implied equity volatility, we create a 
measure that quantifies the slope of the term structure.  Our horizon measure captures the extent 
to which a firm faces relatively short-term versus long-term uncertainty.  Horizon is a volatility-
weighted average duration.  It is similar in spirit to the intraperiod timeliness (IPT) measure used 
in accounting studies  to capture the speed of price discovery over a period of time (e.g., Alford 
et al., 1993; Brown et al., 1999; Beekes and Brown, 2006; Butler et al., 2007; Bushman et al.,  
2010).  Horizon measures the average timing of uncertainty.  Our approach assumes unbiased 
implied volatilities and efficiency in the options market.11   
                                                 
10 Two papers examining the relation between earnings guidance and investment provide conflicting results.  Cheng 
et al. (2007) find that firms which consistently provide earnings guidance invest less in R&D and have lower future 
growth rates, while Houston et al. (2010) find that firms do not increase investment after stopping the issuance of 
earnings guidance.  
11 Poon and Granger (2003) review evidence on the superior accuracy of implied volatilities relative to time-series 
models.   
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The first step in computing Horizon is to compute forward implied volatilities over a set 
of interim periods within a longer period.  In this paper, the set of interim periods are four 91-day 
periods and the longer period is the 365-day period that contains the four 91-day periods.12  




,t t ) that starts at t0 and ends at t1, the forward implied volatility of a second interim period (
1 2
2
,t t ) that starts at t1 and ends at t2, and the implied volatility over the longer period ( 0 2
2
,t t ), 
that is made up of the two interim periods (i.e., it starts at t0 and ends at t2).
13  For example, if the 
implied volatility (σ) from day 0 (t0) to day 30 (t1) is 0.21 and the implied volatility from day 0 to 
day 60 (t2) is 0.20, then the implied volatility from day 30 to day 60 is 0.19. 
 
0 2 0 1 1 2
2 2 2
, , ,1 0 2 1
2 0
1
)t t t t t tt t t tt t
       
          
(1) 
Using Equation (1) adapted to four sub-periods, we calculate forward implied volatilities 
for the second, third, and fourth 91-day periods.  (It is not necessary to calculate the forward 
implied volatility for the first 91-day period because the implied volatility for the first 91-day 
period only captures the expected volatility over that 91-day period.)  The second step is to 
measure the proportion of the total longer period volatility within each of the interim periods – 
the proportion of the 365-day volatility occurring during each of the four 91-day periods.  
Because implied volatilities (and therefore the calculated forward implied volatilities) are quoted 
on an annualized basis, we multiply the daily variances for the 91-day periods (365-day period) 
by 91 (365).  Equation (2) expresses the sum of these proportions, which sums to one by 
                                                 
12 We are limited to a 365-day horizon due to data constraints.  Data is currently available on standardized options 
with durations as long as 730 days, but the data is limited in terms of the number firms and the length of the sample 
period.  The usefulness of our approach increases as the liquidity in long-term options improves, as option 
exchanges expand the number of firms with LEAPS, and with the potential of even longer-term options than 
currently available being introduced in the future.  
13 Equation (1) assumes that returns are independent over time and is in terms of variances (σ2) because variances 
are additive while standard deviations (σ) are not additive. 
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construction because all of the 365-day period volatility must occur during the four 91-day 
periods.  
 
0 91 92 182 183 273 274 365
0 365 0 365 0 365 0 365
2 2 2 2
, , , ,
2 2 2 2
, , , ,
1
(91) (91) (91) (92)
(365) (365) (365) (365)
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
   
   
         
(2) 
The third and final step is to use these proportions to weight the duration of the 
corresponding interim period.  The midpoints of the first, second, third, and fourth 91-day 
periods are 45, 135, 225, and 315 days, respectively.  We use these midpoints as the durations of 
the four 91-day periods.  Equation (3) is the formula for calculating Horizon.    
 
0 91 92 182 183 273 274 365
0 365 0 365 0 365 0 365
2 2 2 2
, , , ,
2 2 2 2
, , , ,
(45) (135) (225) (315)
(91) (91) (91) (92)
(365) (365) (365) (365)
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
Horizon
   
   
   
        (3) 
Horizon is measured in days.  If the longer period is 365 days in length and forward 
volatilities are constant over the interim periods, then the volatility-weighted average duration or 
Horizon equals 180 days.  Larger (smaller) values of Horizon indicate relatively more long-term 
(short-term) uncertainty.  Horizon captures the distribution of uncertainty over time, and thereby 
whether firm information reflects relatively more long-term or short-term uncertainty.14  
Disclosure Horizon 
A firm’s Disclosure Horizon captures the relative proportions of short-term and long-
term information in a firm’s disclosure by examining how disclosure affects the implied 
volatilities of various durations.  For example, if a disclosure results in a relatively large change 
in the short-term implied volatilities, but results in relatively little change in the long-term 
implied volatilities, then we conclude that the disclosure is short-term in nature.  Whereas, if the 
                                                 
14 To the extent that there is seasonal uncertainty within the year for some firms, error is introduced into Horizon for 
these seasonal firms. 
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disclosure affects long-term implied volatilities to a greater extent than short-term implied 
volatilities, then we conclude that the disclosure is long-term in nature.   
The calculation of Disclosure Horizon is very similar to that of Horizon except for the 
following differences.  We exclude the implied volatility over the first 30 days of the one year 
period from all implied volatilities when calculating Disclosure Horizon.15  We do this in order 
to remove the uncertainty due to the disclosure event itself from both the pre-announcement and 
post-announcement implied volatilities.  This is important because the pre-release implied 
volatilities impound the anticipated impact of scheduled announcements (e.g., Patell and 
Wolfson, 1979, 1981; Ederington and Lee, 1996; Rogers et al., 2009; Billings and Jennings, 
2011).        
To calculate Disclosure Horizon, we first compute the absolute value of log changes in 
forward volatilities around a disclosure for each of the four 91-day periods.  For example, 
Equation (4) measures the absolute value of the percentage change in the variance during the 
first 91-day period (excluding the first 30 days) at a disclosure: 
 31 91 31 91
2 2
, ,| ln( / ) |t t post t t pre                    (4) 
We then measure the proportion of the sum of the absolute value of log changes in 
volatility over the 365-day period that pertains to each of the four 91-day periods and use these 
proportions to weight the duration of the corresponding 91-day period.  Equation (5) is the 
formula for calculating Disclosure Horizon.   
        
 Disclosure Horizon   
31 91 31 91 92 182 92 182 183 273 183 273 274 365 274 365
31 91 31 91 9
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
, , , , , , , ,
2 2
, ,
| ln( / ) | (45) | ln( / ) | (135) | ln( / ) | (225) | ln( / ) | (315)
| ln( / ) | | ln(
t t post t t pre t t post t t pre t t post t t pre t t post t t pre
t t post t t pre t
          
   
2 182 92 182 183 273 183 273 274 365 274 365
2 2 2 2 2 2
, , , , , ,
/ ) | | ln( / ) | | ln( / ) |
t post t t pre t t post t t pre t t post t t pre
      
(5) 
                                                 
15 Standardized options data is not available for durations less than 30 days. 
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We use the absolute value of forward implied volatility changes to calculate Disclosure 
Horizon rather than signed differences because disclosure can cause uncertainty to increase or 
decrease.  Clearly, disclosures regarding changes in firm risk can potentially increase or decrease 
uncertainty about firm value (e.g., Hughes and Pae, 2004).  However, disclosures can increase or 
decrease uncertainty absent any explicit statements about firm risk.  For example, uncertainty 
decreases as investors learn more about the parameters of the firm’s earnings distribution 
through firm disclosures (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi, 2003).  Alternatively, the unexpected nature 
of news can increase information asymmetry and volatility (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 1994).  
Similarly, management forecasts of negative news and management forecasts that are made by 
firms that do not typically forecast increase uncertainty about firm value (Rogers et al. 2009).   
Because disclosure can introduce or  resolve uncertainty, examining signed differences in 
uncertainty does not allow one to draw a clear inference about whether the information in the 
disclosure was relatively short-term or long-term in nature.  For example, if Horizon increases, 
this could be due to an increase in long-term uncertainty (holding short-term uncertainty fixed) 
or due to a decrease in short-term uncertainty (holding long-term uncertainty fixed).  Hence, the 
signed change in Horizon at disclosures is not informative about whether the disclosure 
contained relatively more short-term or long-term information.   
Disclosure Horizon and Horizon are of similar magnitudes due to the way these two 
variables are scaled.  However, their interpretations are quite different.  A low value of Horizon 
indicates that a large proportion of the 365-day uncertainty about firm value is concentrated early 
in the 365-day period.  On the other hand, a low value of Disclosure Horizon indicates that over 
a three-day period uncertainty about firm value regarding the early part of the 365-day period has 
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changed (either increased or decreased) to a greater extent than the uncertainty about firm value 
regarding the later part of the 365-day period.     
 
IV. EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS 
Validating Horizon 
 In this section, we develop predictions used to test the validity of Horizon as a measure 
that distinguishes between firms facing relatively more short-term or long-term uncertainty. 
Growth Opportunities 
 Myers (1977) presents the value of a firm as the sum of the value of assets already in 
place and the present value of future growth opportunities.  The present value of these future 
growth opportunities depends on future discretionary investment by the firm.  Smith and Watts 
(1992) document that firms with more growth options have lower leverage, lower dividend 
yields, higher executive compensation, and greater stock-option compensation.  These relations 
are not surprising given that firms with high growth opportunities are valued to a greater extent 
on long-term potential than firms with low growth opportunities.  The resolution of uncertainty 
regarding long-term potential takes time and is therefore more likely to occur later in the future.  
Therefore, we predict growth opportunities to be positively related to the relative amount of 
long-term uncertainty faced by a firm. 
Firms invest in research and development because they have potential for growth.  
Kothari et al. (2002) document a positive relation between current R&D expenditures and the 
standard deviation of the next five annual earnings realizations.  This suggests that R&D 
activities are positively related to uncertainty.  Our interest is not in the magnitude of 
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uncertainty, but in the timing of uncertainty.  We expect a firm’s R&D expenditures to be 
positively related with the extent to which the firm engages in long-term projects whose 
uncertainty takes longer to resolve.  Therefore, we predict a firm’s R&D expense to be positively 
related to the relative amount of long-term uncertainty faced by the firm.  We also predict R&D 
expense to have a stronger, positive relation to the relative amount of long-term uncertainty than 
capital expenditures because capital expenditures are less likely to be long-term projects for 
which uncertainty takes a long time to resolve. 
Negative Shocks 
 Ng et al. (2009) find that poor earnings performance is associated with increases in firm 
risk.  Ertimur (2004) finds that firms reporting losses are associated with greater information 
asymmetry than firms reporting profits.  However, it is not clear whether the increased risk and 
greater informational asymmetry experienced by loss firms is due to short-term or long-term 
concerns.  Accounting losses are indicative of negative shock to a firm (poor performance).  To 
the extent that a firm must overcome this negative shock to survive, we expect accounting losses 
to be positively related to the relative amount of short-term uncertainty faced by a firm. 
 The leverage and “volatility feedback” effects predict equity volatility to increase after 
bad news (e.g., Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; French et al., 1987; Campbell and Hentschel, 1992).  
Negative market returns are indicative of negative shocks (bad news) to the economy.  At the 
macroeconomic level, we expect short-term uncertainty to increase relative to long-term 
uncertainty at the time of negative market-wide shocks.  For example, during the height of the 
financial crisis of 2008, the market was pricing the potential collapse of the United States 
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financial system.  We expect investors to become relatively more concerned about the short-term 
during times of crisis because it is not clear whether there will even be a long-term. 
 Larger firms are typically more diversified, which makes large firms more stable and 
more likely to survive a temporary negative shock than small firms.  Therefore, we expect firm 
size and firm stability to be negatively related to the relative amount of short-term uncertainty. 
Product Development Cycles 
 Industries vary in the length of their product development cycles.  Bushman et al. (1996) 
find that CEOs are more likely to be evaluated subjectively rather than with objective accounting 
measures when their firms have longer product development cycles.  We expect long-term 
(short-term) uncertainty to be relatively greater for firms in industries with long (short) product 
development cycles. 
Predictions about Disclosure Horizon at Earnings Announcements 
If our disclosure horizon measure captures the relative amounts of short-term and long-
term information in a disclosure, we expect Disclosure Horizon to be positively related to the 
horizon of the information provided by management.  A proxy for the horizon of the information 
management discloses is the horizon of their earnings forecasts (i.e., the time between their 
earnings forecast and the actual earnings realization).  Therefore, we expect a positive relation 
between the horizon of management’s earnings forecasts and Disclosure Horizon.      
Collins et al. (1994) show that a lack of earnings timeliness helps explain the low 
contemporaneous return-earnings association.  This lack of timeliness is due to the fact that 
many economic events will not be captured in earnings until future periods.  This lack of 
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timeliness increases with the amount of growth opportunities.  For similar reasons other 
researchers find that accounting earnings are a relatively poor measure of performance for firms 
facing long-term uncertainty (e.g., Bushman et al., 1996; Amir and Lev, 1996; Aboody and Lev, 
1998; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Tasker, 1998; Lev and Zarowin, 1999).  Therefore, we expect 
the relative amount of long-term information in a firm’s earnings announcements to be 
negatively related to the relative amount of long-term uncertainty faced by the firm.16  
We also examine whether firms that issue earnings guidance with their earnings 
announcements provide relatively more short-term information than firms that do not issue 
earnings guidance with their earnings announcements.  Critics of earnings guidance claim that 
earnings guidance either causes or is indicative of a short-term focus that is harmful to a firms’ 
long-run value (e.g., Fuller and Jensen, 2002; Krehmeyer et al., 2006; Hsieh et al., 2006; U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, 2007).17  However, there is little empirical evidence to support this 
claim, and this claim is not obviously true.  For example, given that earnings guidance is a 
forward looking disclosure and that it is potentially positively correlated with other forward 
looking statements, it is conceivable that firms that issue earnings guidance provide relatively 
more long-term information than firms that do not issue earnings guidance.  Therefore, we do not 
make a prediction regarding this empirical question. 
 
  
                                                 
16 We have no reason to believe that firms facing relatively high long-term uncertainty release information about 
their long-term projects with their earnings announcements to any large degree.  For example, information regarding 
an FDA drug approval is more likely to be disclosed immediately rather than held until the firm’s earnings 
announcement.     
17 For a discussion on the costs and benefits of earnings guidance see: Miller (2009), Houston et al. (2010), and 
Chen et al. (2011). 
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V. SAMPLE AND DATA 
We obtain at-the-money implied volatilities of constant durations from the OptionMetrics 
Standardized Options dataset.18  We require firms to have implied volatilities on standardized 
options from OptionMetrics for the following durations: 30, 91, 182, 273, and 365 days.19  We 
collect management forecasts from First Call, financial statement data from Compustat, stock 
market data from CRSP, and analyst forecast data from IBES.  Our sample period is from 
January 2001 through October 2010.  We start in January 2001 to ensure a consistent regulatory 
regime (Regulation Fair Disclosure was enacted towards the end of 2000) and because there are 
a relatively small number of firms prior to 2001.20  Table 1 presents the number of sample firms, 
the percentage of these firms in the S&P 500 index, and the number of firm-quarters by year.   
The number of firms increases over the sample period up until 2009 due to the increasing 
popularity of Long-term Equity AnticiPation Securities (LEAPS).21  The reason for the large 
drop in the number of firms in 2009 and 2010 is unclear, but likely related to the financial 
crisis.22  LEAPS are the same as regular equity options except that these contracts are of a longer 
duration (i.e., durations greater than nine months).  A firm must have LEAPS in order for there 
to be implied volatility data on standardized options with durations greater than 182 days.  This 
requirement limits our sample to relatively large firms.    Consistent with our sample covering 
the economically significant firms in the economy, our sample covers 73 percent of the market 
                                                 
18 These standardized implied volatilities are calculated by OptionMetrics using linear interpolation and a firm’s 
traded options with strike prices around the current stock price and expirations around the desired constant duration.   
19 Durations of 547 and 730 are also available on a more limited basis through OptionMetrics.  In untabulated 
results, we find that Horizon is highly correlated (i.e., Pearson correlation coefficients greater than 0.85) with similar 
measures that take these longer durations (if and when available) into account.     
20 Data is available from OptionMetrics as far back as 1996. 
21 The CBOE launched LEAPS in 1990.  
22 The large drop in the number of firms in 2009 is not unique to the OptionMetrics database.  A secondary source 
also shows a large decrease in the number of firms with LEAPS in 2009.  For a current list of securities with 
exchange-traded LEAPS, see The Options Industry Council web-site.   
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capitalizations on average in each year during our sample period.  In addition, 54 percent of 
sample firm-years are in the S&P 500 index.     
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the firm-quarters in our sample and for the S&P 
500 index option (SPX).  Horizon is equal to a firm’s volatility-weighted duration.  When 
calculating Horizon, we average the implied volatilities of the previous five trading days to 
remove noise and to ensure that the firms’ options trade regularly.  Because we are interested in 
the relation between Horizon, which can be measured daily, and financial statement data, which 
is available quarterly, we select one day during the quarter to measure Horizon.  Specifically, we 
measure Horizon 45 days after the firm’s earnings announcement.  We select 45 days because 
implied equity volatility exhibits a predictable pattern in the days around earnings 
announcements (e.g., Patell and Wolfson, 1979, 1981; Rogers et al., 2009).  The mean and 
median of Horizon indicate that it is typical for firms to face slightly relatively more short-term 
uncertainty; the mean and median are both slightly less than 180 days, at 178 and 179 days, 
respectively.  HorizonSPX is equal to the volatility-weighted duration for the S&P 500 index 
option (SPX), measured on the same days as the firm-level Horizon.  In contrast to the individual 
firms, the mean and median of HorizonSPX are both greater than 180 days, at 185 and 186 days, 
respectively.  The mean and median of HorizonSPX are greater than the mean and median of 
Horizon, which indicates that firms face relatively more short-term uncertainty than the market. 
  In order to illustrate how HorizonSPX varies over time, Figure 1 presents a graph of 
HorizonSPX, measured each day of the sample.  The graph shows that it is typical for there to be 
relatively more long-term uncertainty at the market level (i.e., HorizonSPX is usually greater than 
180 days).  However, at the time of negative market returns there appears to be relatively more 
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short-term uncertainty (e.g., late 2002 and late 2008).23  This is consistent with our prediction 
about the relation between negative shocks and the horizon of uncertainty.   
To investigate the relation between Horizon and variables designed to measure 
differences in the relative amounts of short-term and long-term uncertainty, we measure size as 
Ln(Assets), volatility (the opposite of stability) as σ365, growth opportunities as Ln(MB), R&D, 
R&D Indicator, and CapEx, negative shocks as Loss, market-level horizon as HorizonSPX, and 
product development cycles as PDCShort and PDCLong.  
 Ln(Assets) is equal to the natural logarithm of the firm’s most recent quarter’s total 
assets.  The  median firm in our sample has approximately $6 billion in total assets, which is 
relatively large compared to a median of approximately $400 million for the universe of U.S. 
publicly traded firms during our sample period (untabulated).  σ365 is the standard deviation of 
the firm’s daily returns over the previous 365 calendar days.     
 Ln(MB) is equal to the natural logarithm of the firm’s market-to-book ratio, which is the 
firm’s current (45 days after the earnings announcement) market value divided by the firm’s 
most recent quarter’s  book value of shareholder’s equity.  The median firm in our sample has a 
market-to-book ratio of 2.6 compared to a median of 1.9 for the universe of firms (untabulated).  
This indicates that firms with LEAPS have more growth opportunities than firms that do not.  
R&D is equal to the sum of the firm’s R&D expense for the prior four quarters divided by the 
most recent quarter’s total assets.  R&D Ind is equal to one if R&D is greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise.  CapEx is equal to the sum of the firm’s capital expenditures for the prior four 
quarters divided by the most recent quarter’s total assets.    
                                                 




Loss is equal to one if the firm’s most recent quarter’s income before extraordinary items 
is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  Firms report losses in 20 percent of the firm quarters in our 
sample, which is a relatively low percentage.24  This relatively low percentage reflects the 
profitable nature of firms with long-term exchange traded options which have a median return on 
assets of 4.5% compared to a median return on assets of 1.4% for the universe of firms 
(untabulated).  The profitable nature of our sample firms supports our use of accounting losses as 
a measure of a negative firm-specific shock.   
PDCShort (PDCLong) is equal to one if the firm’s industry is classified as having a short 
(long) product development cycle in Bushman et al. (1996), and zero otherwise.  The 
classification in Bushman et al. (1996) is adapted from a classification by the National Academy 
of Engineering.  Because the classification is not exhaustive, some industries are classified has 
having neither a short nor a long product development cycle.      
 
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Horizon, Firm Characteristics, and Market Conditions 
 
In this subsection, we test our predictions about the validity of Horizon as a measure that 
distinguishes between firms facing relatively more long-term or short-term uncertainty.  Table 3 
presents Pearson and Spearman rank correlations for all of the variables of interest.  Not 
surprisingly, Horizon is strongly associated with HorizonSPX.  This suggests that economic 
conditions similarly affect the relative timing of uncertainty for both firms and the market.  As 
                                                 
24 For example, Givoly and Hayn (2000) find that 34 percent of firm-years from 1991-1998 are loss years. 
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predicted, Horizon is positively related to Ln(Assets) and Ln(MB) and negatively correlated with 
Loss, σ365, and PDCShort.   
In order to test our predictions, we estimate variations of the following regression (firm 
and time subscripts suppressed): 
Horizon = β1Ln(Assets) + β2Ln(MB) + β3R&D (or R&D Ind) + β4CapEx+ β5Loss + β6HorizonSPX 
+ β7PDCShort + β8PDCLong + β9Ln(OpInt) + β10Ln(Vol) + β11StOpInt + β12StVol + 
β13σ365 + Year-quarter fixed effects + ε                                         (6)                        
 
Table 4 presents the results.25  R&D and R&D Ind are both positively related to Horizon.  The 
coefficient on R&D Ind suggests that, on average, firms that invest in research and development 
have a Horizon that is 1.27 days longer than firms that do not invest in research and 
development.  This means that more of the uncertainty about firm value for firms that invest in 
research and development occurs later relative to firms that do not invest in research and 
development.  While 1.27 days may not appear to be of large economic significance, it is a 
relatively large proportion (about 10 percent) of the interquartile range and the standard 
deviation of Horizon (about 11 days).  The variation in Horizon is naturally small given that its 
range is bounded between 45 and 315 and that all firms are going to have at least some 
uncertainty in each of the four interim periods.  In addition, bear in mind that we are measuring 
the timing of uncertainty only within a 365-day period.  Detecting differences in the timing of 
uncertainty using such an approach is decreasing in the extent to which one year does not 
represent the long-term for a firm.  For example, if information regarding uncertainty about all of 
a firm’s projects takes longer than one year to arrive, this approach would not conclude that such 
a firm faces relatively more long-term uncertainty.   
                                                 
25All regression t-statistics in this paper are calculated based on two-way (by 2-digit SIC code and year-quarter) 
cluster-robust standard errors (e.g., Petersen, 2009; Gow et al., 2010) to correct for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence.   
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Consistent with our prediction, we find that the coefficient on R&D is significantly 
greater than the coefficient on CapEx.  This suggests that the uncertainty regarding research and 
development takes longer to resolve than uncertainty regarding capital expenditures.  Also 
consistent with a positive relation between growth opportunities and long-term projects, we find 
that Ln(MB) is positively related to Horizon.    
Consistent with negative shocks shifting relative uncertainty towards the present, we find 
that losses are negatively related to Horizon.  The coefficient on Loss suggests that, on average, 
firms that report an accounting loss for the previous quarter face a Horizon that is between 1.16 
and 1.53 days shorter than firms that report profits.  The coefficient on Loss in the fourth 
regression is insignificant due to its correlation with σ365.  This is not surprising because firms 
with a loss this quarter are more likely to have higher volatility during the past year than 
profitable firms.   Also consistent with negative shocks shifting relative uncertainty towards the 
present, in untabulated results, we find that the coefficients on the year-quarter fixed effects tend 
to be greater during times of market strength (e.g., 2003–2004) and tend to be smaller during 
times of market weakness (e.g., 2008).  For example, on average, firms’ Horizons were more 
than 10 days shorter during the fourth quarter of 2008, which was a period of extreme market 
weakness, than they were during the first quarter of 2001.   
As expected, we find that firm size, measured as Ln(Assets), is positively related to 
Horizon.  We also find that σ365 is negatively related to Horizon.  These two results are consistent 
with larger firms and stable firms being more likely to be able to withstand a temporary negative 
shock. 
We find that firms with short product development cycles have shorter horizons than 
average (i.e., firms classified as having neither short nor long product development cycles), in 
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the first and second regressions.  In the first regression, we find that the coefficient on PDCShort is 
significantly less (at the 10 percent level) than the coefficient on PDCLong, which suggests that 
firms in short product development industries have shorter horizons than firms in long product 
development industries.  This result is significant at the 5 percent level if Ln(MB) and R&D Ind 
are excluded from the regression (untabulated).  However, there is not a significant difference 
between the coefficients on PDCShort and PDCLong in the second, third, or fourth regressions.     
HorizonSPX and the year-quarter fixed effects explain the large majority of the variation in 
Horizon.  In untabulated results, a regression of Horizon on solely these variables yields an Adj. 
R2 of 16.99 percent, while the regressions in Table 4 have Adj. R2 that range from 20.53 percent 
to 25.70 percent.  This suggests that market-wide economic conditions play the most important 
role regarding the timing of uncertainty about firm value within a period of one year. 
In the third and fourth regressions, we include controls for option liquidity and option 
investor interest.  Ln(OpInt) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total open interest of all 
exchange traded options for that firm.  Ln(Vol) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total 
volume of all exchange traded options for that firm.  StOpInt is equal to the proportion of the 
total open interest in exchange traded options with less than nine months to expiration.  StVol is 
equal to the proportion of the total volume in exchange traded options with less than nine months 
to expiration.26  We measure Ln(OpInt), Ln(Vol), StOpInt, and StVol on the same day as Horizon.  
Sample firms must have non-zero open interest and volume in their exchange traded options.  To 
the extent that investor interest in short-term options drives up their implied volatilities, we 
expect StOpInt and StVol to be negatively related to Horizon.   
                                                 
26Regular options generally have nine months or less to expiration.  Only firms with LEAPS have options with 
greater than nine months to expiration.  Because all of our firms have LEAPS trading, our StOpInt and StVol 
variables measure the proportion of open interest and volume in firms’ non-LEAPS options. 
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We find that Ln(OpInt) and Ln(Vol) are negatively related to Horizon.  This suggests that 
option investors prefer to trade options on firms with relatively higher short-term uncertainty.  
As expected the coefficients on StOpInt and StVol are significantly negative.  This is consistent 
with greater trading in a firm’s short-term options driving up the short-term implied volatilities 
relative to long-term implied volatilities which results in a smaller Horizon.  The liquidity and 
investor interest control variables are important because they show that the results regarding firm 
characteristics and market conditions are not due to differing amounts of liquidity and investor 
interest.27  
An alternative explanation to some of these results regarding the term structure of 
implied volatilities and firm characteristics is that due to some behavioral or institutional bias 
option investors trade differently based on the firm characteristics that we have identified.  For 
example, it could be the case that investors overpay for long-term options on firms with high 
R&D and underpay for long-term options on firms with low R&D.  We leave it to future research 
to create and test a profitable option trading strategy that takes advantage of these potential 
biases.             
Horizon and the Term Structure of the Dispersion in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 
To provide further evidence that Horizon captures differences in investor uncertainty 
over different horizons, we test for an association between Horizon and the term structure of the 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts.  Since analysts’ uncertainty about earnings over 
various horizons is measurable through the dispersion in analyst estimates for these various 
horizons, a term structure of analyst uncertainty can be created which we call AnalystTermSt.  
                                                 
27 The results in Table 4 are robust to using a non-continuous horizon measure.  Specifically, we create a variable 
that is equal to one for the top 20 percent of the Horizon measure by year-quarter, equal to zero for the middle 60 
percent, and equal to negative one for the bottom 20 percent.  This robustness test suggests that the results are not 
driven by outliers. 
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AnalystTermSt is equal to the standard deviation of analyst estimates for the firm’s next fiscal 
year’s earnings scaled by the median estimate for the next fiscal year divided by the standard 
deviation of analyst estimates for the firm’s current fiscal year’s earnings scaled by the median 
estimate for the current fiscal year.28  It captures the amount of uncertainty over next year’s 
earnings relative to the amount of uncertainty over this year’s earnings.29  The descriptive 
statistics in Table 3 show that analysts are, on average, nearly twice as uncertain about next 
year’s earnings as they are about this year’s earnings (mean of AnalystTermSt is 1.93).   
Note, however, that Horizon captures uncertainty about firm value, while the term 
structure of the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts captures uncertainty about earnings.  
These are two distinct constructs, but should be positively related.  To test this, we estimate the 
following two regressions (firm and time subscripts suppressed):  
AnalystTermSt = β1Ln(Assets) + β2Ln(MB) + β3R&D + β4CapEx+ β5Loss + β6HorizonSPX + 
β7PDCShort + β8PDCLong + β9Ln(OpInt) + β10Ln(Vol) + β11StOpInt + β12StVol + 
β13σ365 + Year-quarter fixed effects + ε                             (7)                         
  
 Horizon = β1HorizonSPX + β2AnalystTermSt + β3#AnalystSt + β4#AnalsytLt+ β5Ln(OpInt) + 
β6Ln(Vol) + β7StOpInt + β8StVol + Year-quarter fixed effects + ε                             (8)  
 
Table 5 presents the results.  The first regression in Table 5 is the same as the fourth 
regression from Table 4 except that the dependent variable is AnalystTermSt rather than Horizon.  
The purpose of this regression is to determine whether the independent variables load on 
AnalystTermSt in a similar fashion as they do on Horizon.  R&D, PDCShort, and σ365 have 
significant coefficients of the same sign as in Table 4.  This suggests that, like option investors, 
analysts view firms with more R&D as having more uncertainty about the long-term and view 
                                                 
28 Firms with a median earnings estimate less than $0.10 per share for the current fiscal year or the next fiscal year 
are excluded to avoid problems with a small denominator. 
29 We focus on this year’s and next year’s earnings because the number of analysts making forecasts declines as one 
goes further out into the future. 
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firms from short product develop cycle industries and firms with greater past volatility as having 
more uncertainty about the short-term.  The other variables in the regression do not have 
significant coefficients. 
The second regression tests whether there is a positive relationship between 
AnalystTermSt and Horizon.  We control for the number of analysts giving forecasts for the 
current year and next year because the presence of relatively more short-term forecasts suggests 
that short-term uncertainty may be inherently more important for the firm.  #AnalystSt is equal to 
the number of analyst forecasts made during the current quarter for the firm’s current fiscal year 
earnings.  #AnalystLt is equal to the number of analyst forecasts made during the current quarter 
for the firm’s next fiscal year earnings.  We also control for market conditions with HorizonSPX 
and for option liquidity with Ln(OpInt), Ln(Vol), StOpInt, and StVol.   
We find that the term structure of analysts’ uncertainty is positively associated with 
Horizon.  This confirms our expectation that the horizon of firm uncertainty is related to the 
relative uncertainty regarding earnings over different horizons.  We also find that #AnalystSt 
(#AnalystLt) is negatively (positively) related to Horizon.  This suggests that a relatively higher 
number of near-term (longer-term) forecasts is associated with relatively higher short-term (long-
term) uncertainty.     
The advantage of Horizon over the term structure of analyst uncertainty is that it can be 
calculated on a daily basis, whereas analysts do not update their forecasts that frequently.  Other 
advantages of Horizon are that uncertainty about stock price incorporates all sources of 
uncertainty (not just uncertainty about earnings) and that market-based sources of information 




Disclosure Horizon and Earnings Guidance at Earnings Announcements 
In this subsection, we test our predictions regarding the validity of Disclosure Horizon as 
a measure of the relative amounts of short-term and long-term information in a disclosure and 
whether earnings guidance is associated with relatively more short-term information.  Table 6 
presents descriptive statistics for the Disclosure Horizon measure and other variables for the full 
sample of earnings announcements and a sub-period of the full sample for which we obtained 
conference call data.  In Panel A, the conference call subsample period is 2002 -2008, while in 
Panel B, the full sample period is 2001 – October 2010.  Disclosure Horizon measures whether 
changes in implied volatilities at earnings announcements occur primarily in a firm’s short-term 
options or in a firm’s long-term options.  Horizonpre is the firm’s volatility-weighted duration 
two days prior to the earnings announcement.  Horizonpre,SPX is the SPX’s volatility-weighted 
duration two days prior to the earnings announcement.   Disclosure HorizonSPX is equal to the 
volatility-weighted duration change for the S&P 500 index option (SPX), over the same three-
day earnings announcement windows as the firms.  The implied volatility for the first 30 days is 
excluded from the calculations of Disclosure Horizon, Disclosure HorizonSPX, Horizonpre, and 
Horizonpre,SPX to remove any effect due to the announcement itself from the variables.  The mean 
of Disclosure HorizonSPX (155 days) is much less than the mean of Disclosure Horizon (180 
days) at firms’ earnings announcements.  In untabulated results, we find that this holds outside of 
firms’ earnings announcements as well.  This suggests that day to day information is more short-
term in nature for the S&P 500 than it is for the average firm.   
AnnRet is equal to the firm’s compounded three-day stock return during the earnings 
announcement window.  AnnRet2 is equal to AnnRet squared.  OpenInt is equal to the natural 
logarithm of the total open interest prior to the earnings announcement window of all exchange 
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traded options for that firm.  StOpenInt is equal to the natural logarithm of the proportion of the 
total open interest prior to the earnings announcement window in exchange traded options with 
less than nine months to expiration.   OpenInt and StOpenInt are calculated the day prior to the 
three-day earnings announcement window.  
Forecast Horizon is equal to the natural logarithm of the average of all the EPS forecast 
horizons that a firm bundled with an earnings announcement.  Forecast Horizon is only 
calculated for earnings announcements that contained a management forecast of EPS.  Each 
individual forecast horizon is equal to the difference between the end of the fiscal period being 
forecasted and the forecast date.  The mean Forecast Horizon of 4.83 indicates that on average, 
managers provide earnings forecasts with an average horizon of 125 days when they provide 
earnings guidance with an earnings announcement.   
Bundled is equal to one if the firm issued an EPS forecast within a three day window 
around their earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise.  Consistent with Anilowski, Feng, 
and Skinner (2007) and Rogers and Van Buskirk (2012), a large percentage, 40 percent, of the 
earnings announcements in our full sample contain earnings guidance.  29 percent of the 
earnings announcements in Rogers and Van Buskirk (2012) contain earnings guidance.  The 
larger percentage of bundled earnings announcements in our sample likely reflects the fact that 
our firms are much larger and of more interest to analysts and investors (which creates greater 
demand for earnings guidance).   
Conf. Call is equal to one if the firm held a conference call within a three day window 
around their earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise.30  Conference calls are held in 24 
percent of our earnings announcements during the 2002 – 2008 period.  Bundled*Conf. Call is 
equal to one if the firm both issued an EPS forecast and held a conference call within a three day 
                                                 
30 Conference call dates were graciously provided by Michael Minnis. 
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window around their earnings announcement, and zero otherwise.  12 percent of earnings 
announcement in our conference call subsample provided earnings guidance and held a 
conference call.      
To get an idea for the relations between the variables of interest, Table 7 presents Pearson 
and Spearman rank correlations for all of the variables of interest at earnings announcements.  
The strongest relation is the negative correlation between Disclosure Horizon and Horizonpre.  
This suggests that the relative amount of short-term information increases as the relative amount 
of long-term uncertainty increases.      
In order to test our predictions about the disclosure horizon of the information at earnings 
announcements, we estimate variations of the following regression (firm and time subscripts are 
suppressed): 
Disclosure Horizon = β1Forecast Horizon + β2Bundled + β3Conf. Call + β4Bundled*Conf. Call 
+ β5Horizonpre + β6Horizonpre,SPX + β7Disclosure HorizonSPX + β8AnnRet + 
β9AnnRet
2 + Year-quarter fixed effects + ε                                              (9)                        
 
Table 8 presents the results of these regressions.  Horizonpre controls for the current shape 
of a firm’s term structure and should capture any predictable movements in the term structure 
driven by its initial state.  The initial state of the term structure (Horizonpre), as shown earlier in 
Table 4, is driven by market conditions (e.g., the VIX index) and firm characteristics (e.g., 
growth opportunities), therefore we do not control for additional variables that are already neatly 
captured in Horizonpre.  Horizonpre also allows us to examine whether firms with more long-term 
uncertainty have less long-term information in their earnings announcements.  The significantly 
negative coefficient on Horizonpre, in all three regressions, indicates that firms with relatively 
more long-term uncertainty have earnings announcements with relatively more short-term 
information (i.e., the information in their earnings announcements affects short-term uncertainty 
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relatively more than long-term uncertainty).  This is consistent with accounting earnings not 
being as good a measure of performance for firms facing long-term uncertainty (e.g., firms with 
large investments in R&D and/or many growth opportunities).   
Horiozonpre,SPX and Disclosure HorizonSPX control for market conditions at the time of the 
earnings announcements.  AnnRet and AnnRet2 control for the nature of the information released 
in terms of whether the announcement was good or bad news (AnnRet) and the magnitude of the 
news (AnnRet2).  Many volatility forecasting models use the sign and the magnitude of the 
innovation (i.e., the stock return) to predict volatility.  These two variables should capture any 
changes in implied volatilities during the earnings announcement window due to expected 
volatility clustering or mean reversion related to the news itself but unrelated to the firm’s 
disclosure policy.   
In the first regression, the significantly (at the 10 percent level) positive coefficient on 
Forecast Horizon indicates that longer horizon management forecasts are associated with a 
longer Disclosure Horizon.  This result helps us validate that our disclosure horizon measure is 
capturing the relative amounts of short-term and long-term information in a disclosure.  We also 
control for presence of conference calls in the first regression.  When firms issue earnings 
guidance and hold a conference call, they have a Disclosure Horizon that is three days longer 
than when they issue earnings guidance and do not hold a conference call.  This suggests that 
managers are conveying longer-term information in their conference calls.    
The significantly negative coefficient on Bundled in the second regression indicates that 
firms that bundle earnings guidance with their earnings announcements, on average, have a 
Disclosure Horizon that is nearly three days shorter than firms that do not bundle.  This means 
that bundled earnings announcements affect short-term implied volatilities to a relatively greater 
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extent than they affect long-term implied volatilities, which suggests that there is relatively more 
short-term information in bundled earnings announcements than in non-bundled earnings 
announcements.  This result is consistent with a positive association between the issuance of 
earnings guidance and a short-term focus.  This result is also consistent with Rogers et al. (2009) 
who find that stand-alone management forecasts affect short-term implied volatility to a greater 
extent than long-term implied volatility.  The significantly negative coefficient on Bundled holds 
in the third regression which controls for the presence of conference calls.  Unlike in the first 
regression, the coefficient on Conf. Call is now significantly negative.  This indicates that firms 
that hold conference calls but do not issue earnings guidance provide relatively short-term 
information in their conference calls.  Consistent with the first regression, the interaction term, 
Bundled*Conf. Call is significantly positive which indicates that firms that both bundle and hold 
conference calls have longer disclosure horizons.  Taken together, the coefficients on Bundled 
and Bundled*Conf. Call suggest that managers through conference calls can explain their 
forecasts or disclose additional information that shifts focus away from the short-term.    
A potential concern is that bundled earnings announcements may contain more 
information than non-bundled earnings announcements and therefore are larger volatility shocks.  
These relatively larger volatility shocks for bundled earnings announcements are then reflected 
to a relatively greater extent in the short-term due to the mean reversion property of volatility 
resulting in a shorter disclosure horizon.  We alleviate this concern in two ways.  First, we 
control for the sign and the size of the volatility shock with AnnRet and AnnRet2.  Second, the 
correlation coefficients in Table 7 show that bundled earnings announcements are negatively 
correlated with the magnitude of the announcement news.  This indicates that the bundled 
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earnings announcements in our sample actually contain less information than the non-bundled 
earnings announcements.      
The significantly positive coefficient on AnnRet in the second and third regression 
indicates that the information at good news earnings announcements affects long duration 
options relatively more than the information in bad news earnings announcements.   This is 
consistent with an asymmetry in which bad news inherently increases uncertainty more than 
good news (e.g., Black 1976; Christie 1982) and this increase in uncertainty is reflected to a 
greater extent in the short-term due to the mean reversion of volatility (e.g., Engle and Patton 
2001).  The significantly negative coefficient on AnnRet2 in the second and third regressions is 
also consistent with mean reversion in volatility.  In this case, earnings-related shocks affect 
volatility to a greater extent in the short-run and the effect dissipates over a longer horizon.  This 
result also suggests that extreme earnings news is less persistent given that the short-term 
implied volatilities are affected to a greater extent than the long-term implied volatilities.  If a 
piece of information is persistent (i.e. has long-term implications) it should affect the long-term 
volatilities just as much as the short-term volatilities, which is not the case with extreme news at 
earnings announcements.  This is consistent with Freeman and Tse (1992) which document that 
the stock market’s response to earnings news is nonlinear (i.e., the stock market responds less per 
unit of extreme news).     
Open Interest in Short-Term Options at Bundled Announcements  
In the previous subsection, we show that bundled earnings announcements are associated 
with relatively greater amounts of short-term information than non-bundled earnings 
announcements.  We also show that longer management forecast horizons are associated with 
relatively greater amounts of long-term information.  Bushee and Noe (2000) find that transient 
34 
 
institutions are drawn to firms with short-term information events.  In this subsection, we 
examine whether there is more open interest in the short-term options prior to bundled earnings 
announcements and prior to bundled earnings announcements with relatively short forecast 
horizons.  While all options trading is short-term to a certain extent, a trader in a 30-day contract 
is likely speculating or hedging in a  way that differs greatly from a trader in a 365-day contract.  
To the extent that bundling earnings guidance with earnings announcements and management’s 
forecast horizon is persistent and/or predictable and indicative of a firm’s overall disclosure 
strategy, we expect “transient option investors”, like the transient institutions in Bushee and Noe 
(2000), to be attracted to firms’ short-term options and trade more heavily in them when firms 
provide relatively short horizon forecasts and when they bundle.   To test this prediction, we 
estimate two variations of the following regression:   
StOpInt = β1Forecast Horizon + β2Bundled + β3Horizonpre + β4Horizonpre,SPX + β5OpenInt + 
Year-quarter fixed effects + ε                                                                                   (10)                         
 Table 9 presents the results of these regressions.  In the first regression, the significantly 
negative coefficient on Forecast Horizon indicates that longer forecast horizons are associated 
with less open interest in short-term options.  This indicates that a firm giving a 90 day forecast 
has approximately 2% more open interest in short-term options compared to a firm giving a 365 
day forecast.  In the second regression, the significant coefficient of 0.0084 on Bundled indicates 
that firms that bundle their earnings announcement with earnings guidance have 0.84 percent 
more open interest in options with less than nine months to expiration than firms that do not 
bundle.  This is consistent with more short-term trading in firms that bundle their earnings 
forecasts.  The significantly negative coefficients on OpenInt indicate that the most popular and 
liquid option-listed firms have relatively more open interest in options with less than nine months 
to expiration.  The significantly negative coefficients on Horizonpre indicate that firms with 
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relatively more long-term uncertainty have relatively more open interest in their short-term 
options. Taken together the coefficients on Forecast Horizon and Bundled these results suggest 
that using open interest in short-term options prior to information events is a potentially useful 
proxy for detecting short-term trading activity and also potentially useful in evaluating the nature 
of a firm’s disclosures.  Future research should analyze the similarities and benefits of this 
approach compared to the Bushee (1998, 2001) classification. 
   
VII. CONCLUSION 
Using the term structure of implied equity volatilities, we develop a measure, Horizon, to 
capture whether a firm is subject to relatively more short-term or long-term uncertainty.  We 
validate our measure by showing that it is positively related to R&D expenditures and growth 
opportunities.  We also find that Horizon is positively related to firm size as well as firm stability 
and negatively related to accounting losses and negative market-wide shocks.   
Using a similar approach, we develop a measure, Disclosure Horizon, which determines 
whether a firm’s disclosure contains relatively more short-term or long-term information.  We 
validate our measure by showing that it is positively related to the horizon of managers’ earnings 
forecasts.  We find that firms facing relatively more long-term uncertainty have earnings 
announcements that contain relatively more short-term information.  This suggests that earnings 
announcements do not conveying long-term information for firms with high amounts of long-
term uncertainty.  We also find that bundled earnings announcements are associated with 
relatively more short-term information than non-bundled earnings announcements.  This finding 
is consistent with earnings guidance being associated with a greater short-term focus by 
managers and investors.  There is also greater trading in short-term options prior to bundled 
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earnings announcements compared to non-bundled earnings announcements and prior to bundled 
earnings announcements with relatively short horizon management forecasts.  This suggests that 
the short-term information exhibited in earnings guidance attracts short-term investors.     
Our Horizon measure is a market-based measure of a firm’s duration which expands our 
understanding of the firm and its risks.  For example, investors can use Horizon to anticipate the 
timing of major events and to determine whether a change in volatility is temporary or expected 
to persist.   The relation between Horizon and future investment should be examined in future 
research, as well as, Horizon’s usefulness as a measure of market sentiment and the relation 
between Horizon and future returns (or cost of capital).   
Our Disclosure Horizon measure potentially broadens researchers’ ability to evaluate the 
nature of various types of corporate disclosures.  For example, one interesting corporate 
disclosure to examine in the future may be conference presentations (Bushee, Jung, and Miller 
2011).  In these conference presentations, managers usually disclose information about the long-
run strategy of the business to build a loyal “dedicated” investor base.  Disclosure Horizon 
would measure the relative amount of long-run information provided during these presentations, 
which is an interesting dimension of disclosure that has been largely unexplored by prior 
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Total 6,027 54% 19,973 
This table presents the number of firms, the percentage of these firms in the S&P 500 index, and the 
number of firm-quarters in our sample by year.   Firms must have implied volatilities on standardized 
options from OptionMetrics for all of the following durations: 30, 91, 182, 273, and 365 days.  Firms 
must also have stock market data on CRSP and financial statement data on Compustat.  The sample 





















Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th 
Horizon 19,973 178.10 11.49 172.19 179.17 185.12 
Ln(Assets) 19,973 8.66 1.84 7.48 8.62 9.90 
Ln(MB) 19,973 1.00 0.85 0.48 0.96 1.47 
R&D 19,973 0.043 0.083 0 0 0.06 
R&D Ind 19,973 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 
CapEx 19,973 0.013 0.019 0.003 0.008 0.016 
Loss 19,973 0.19 0.39 0 0 0 
HorizonSPX 19,973 184.61 8.84 180.65 185.72 191.54 
PDCShort 19,973 0.37 0.48 0 0 1 
PDCLong 19,973 0.25 0.43 0 0 0 
σ365 19,973 0.44 0.25 0.27 0.37 0.53 
Ln(OpInt) 19,973 11.03 1.45 10.10 11.03 11.97 
Ln(Vol) 19,973 6.81 2.15 5.44 6.97 8.33 
StOpInt 19,973 0.79 0.17 0.71 0.84 0.92 
StVol 19,973 0.91 0.17 0.90 0.98 1.00 
#AnalystSt 12,871 21.81 15.58 11.00 18.00 28.00 
#AnalystLt 12,871 19.64 14.00 10.00 16.00 25.00 
AnalystTermSt 12,871 1.93 1.74 0.98 1.48 2.32 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the firm-quarters in our sample and for the S&P 500 index 
option (SPX).  Horizon is equal to a firm’s volatility-weighted duration.  We measure Horizon 45 days 
after an earnings announcement.  Ln(Assets) is equal to the natural logarithm of the firm’s most recent 
quarter’s total assets.  Ln(MB) is equal to the natural logarithm of the firm’s market-to-book ratio, which 
is the firm’s current (45 days after the earnings announcement) market value divided by the firm’s most 
recent quarter’s  book value of shareholder’s equity.  R&D is equal to the sum of the firm’s R&D expense 
for the prior four quarters divided by the most recent quarter’s total assets.  R&D Ind is equal to one if 
R&D is greater than zero, and zero otherwise.  CapEx is equal to the sum of the firm’s capital 
expenditures for the prior four quarters divided by the most recent quarter’s total assets.  Loss is equal to 
one if the firm’s most recent quarter’s income before extraordinary items is less than zero, and zero 
otherwise.  HorizonSPX  is equal to the volatility-weighted duration for the S&P 500 index option (SPX), 
measured on the same days as Horizon.  PDCShort (PDCLong) is equal to one if the firm’s industry is 
classified as having a short (long) product development cycle in Bushman et al. (1996), and zero 
otherwise.  σ365 is the standard deviation of the firm’s daily returns over the previous 365 calendar days.  
Ln(OpInt) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total open interest of all exchange traded options for that 
firm.  Ln(Vol) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total volume of all exchange traded options for that 
firm.  StOpInt is equal to the proportion of the total open interest in exchange traded options with less 
than nine months to expiration.  StVol is equal to the proportion of the total volume in exchange traded 
options with less than nine months to expiration.  We measure Ln(OpInt), Ln(Vol), StOpInt, and StVol on 
the same day as Horizon.  #AnalystSt is equal to the number of analyst forecasts made during the current 
quarter for the firm’s current fiscal year earnings.  #AnalystLt is equal to the number of analyst forecasts 
made during the current quarter for the firm’s next fiscal year earnings.  AnalystTermSt is equal to the 
standard deviation of analyst estimates for the firm’s next fiscal year’s earnings scaled by the median 
estimate for the next fiscal year divided by the standard deviation of analyst estimates for the firm’s 





Pearson and Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 
 
(a) Correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level;  (b) Correlation coefficient is significant at the 10% level;  (c) Correlation coefficient is not significant at the 10% level 
This table presents Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients above (below) the diagonal.  Horizon is equal to a firm’s volatility-weighted duration.  We measure Horizon 45 days after an earnings announcement.  Ln(Assets) is 
equal to the natural logarithm of the firm’s most recent quarter’s total assets.  Ln(MB) is equal to the natural logarithm of the firm’s market-to-book ratio, which is the firm’s current (45 days after the earnings announcement) market 
value divided by the firm’s most recent quarter’s  book value of shareholder’s equity.  R&D is equal to the sum of the firm’s R&D expense for the prior four quarters divided by the most recent quarter’s total assets.  R&D Ind is 
equal to one if R&D is greater than zero, and zero otherwise.  CapEx is equal to the sum of the firm’s capital expenditures for the prior four quarters divided by the most recent quarter’s total assets.  Loss is equal to one if the firm’s 
most recent quarter’s income before extraordinary items is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  HorizonSPX is equal to the volatility-weighted duration for the S&P 500 index option (SPX), measured on the same days as Horizon.  
PDCShort (PDCLong) is equal to one if the firm’s industry is classified as having a short (long) product development cycle in Bushman et al. (1996), and zero otherwise.  σ365 is the standard deviation of the firm’s daily returns over the 
previous 365 calendar days.  Ln(OpInt) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total open interest of all exchange traded options for that firm.  Ln(Vol) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total volume of all exchange traded 
options for that firm.  StOpInt is equal to the proportion of the total open interest in exchange traded options with less than nine months to expiration.  StVol is equal to the proportion of the total volume in exchange traded options 
with less than nine months to expiration.  We measure Ln(OpInt), Ln(Vol), StOpInt, and StVol on the same day as Horizon.  #AnalystSt is equal to the number of analyst forecasts made during the current quarter for the firm’s current 
fiscal year earnings.  #AnalystLt is equal to the number of analyst forecasts made during the current quarter for the firm’s next fiscal year earnings.  AnalystTermSt is equal to the standard deviation of analyst estimates for the firm’s 
next fiscal year’s earnings scaled by the median estimate for the next fiscal year divided by the standard deviation of analyst estimates for the firm’s current fiscal year’s earnings scaled by the median estimate for the current fiscal 






















































Horizon 1.00 0.18 0.08 -0.02 0.01(c) -0.08 -0.10 0.30 -0.08 -0.00(c) -0.26 -0.01(b) -0.05 -0.13 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.03 
Ln(Assets) 0.21 1.00 -0.23 -0.43 -0.30 -0.11 -0.22 0.00(c) -0.18 -0.02 -0.26 0.53 0.42 -0.10 -0.01(c) 0.28 0.28 -0.03 
Ln(MB) 0.07 -0.21 1.00 0.26 0.25 0.05 -0.15 0.13 0.01(c) 0.05 -0.23 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.00(c) 0.07 
R&D -0.02 -0.38 0.31 1.00 0.53 -0.09 0.30 -0.02(a) 0.05 0.19 0.17 -0.02 -0.02(a) 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.09 
R&D Ind 0.01(c) -0.29 0.29 0.93 1.00 -0.11 0.10 -0.02 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.01(c) -0.01(c) -0.07 -0.04 0.01(b) 
CapEx -0.07 -0.13 0.16 -0.07 -0.03 1.00 -0.01(a) -0.05 -0.00(c) 0.21 0.05 0.01(c) 0.05 0.00(c) 0.01(a) 0.21 0.20 0.00(c) 
Loss -0.10 -0.20 -0.16 0.17 0.10 -0.07 1.00 -0.07 -0.01(b) 0.11 0.40 -0.02(a) -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 0.01(c) 
HorizonSPX 0.27 0.00
(c) 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 1.00 -0.01(c) -0.01(c) -0.32 -0.01(c) -0.02 0.01(c) -0.01(b) -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 
PDCShort -0.09 -0.21 0.02 0.15 0.12 0.06 -0.01
(b) -0.01(c) 1.00 -0.44 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.09 -0.08 
PDCLong 0.00
(c) 0.02(a) 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.21 0.11 -0.01(c) -0.44 1.00 -0.00(c) 0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.01(a) 0.11 0.11 0.06 
σ365 -0.32 -0.39 -0.17 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.37 -0.35 0.18 0.00
(c) 1.00 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.01(c) 0.05 0.03 -0.02 
Ln(OpInt) -0.01(b) 0.52 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.01(c) -0.00(c) 0.03 0.07 0.04 1.00 0.81 -0.06 -0.01(c) 0.43 0.44 -0.03 
Ln(Vol) -0.05 0.41 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.81 1.00 0.03 0.07 0.43 0.44 -0.03 
StOpInt -0.14 -0.14 0.03 0.00(c) -0.01(c) -0.02 -0.05 -0.01(c) 0.04 -0.03 0.09 -0.08 -0.01(a) 1.00 0.33 0.03 0.04 0.05 
StVol -0.09 -0.19 -0.01(c) -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02(a) 0.02 -0.04 0.01(c) -0.31 -0.23 0.38 1.00 0.05 0.06 -0.01(c) 
#AnalystSt -0.05 0.32 -0.01
(c) -0.02 -0.04 0.13 -0.10 -0.01(c) 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.48 0.47 0.00(c) -0.11 1.00 0.94 -0.12 
#AnalaystLt -0.05 0.32 0.03 -0.01(c) -0.02 0.13 -0.12 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.48 0.48 0.02(b) -0.11 0.92 1.00 -0.06 
Analyst 
TermStr 




Regression Analysis of Horizon 
The dependent variable, Horizon, is equal to a firm’s volatility-weighted duration measured 45 days after an earnings announcement.  Ln(Assets) 
is equal to the natural logarithm of the firm’s most recent quarter’s total assets.  Ln(MB) is equal to the natural logarithm of the firm’s market-to-
book ratio, which is the firm’s current (45 days after the earnings announcement) market value divided by the firm’s most recent quarter’s  book 
value of shareholder’s equity.  R&D is equal to the sum of the firm’s R&D expense for the prior four quarters divided by the most recent 
quarter’s total assets.  R&D Ind is equal to one if R&D is greater than zero, and zero otherwise.  CapEx is equal to the sum of the firm’s capital 
expenditures for the prior four quarters divided by the most recent quarter’s total assets.  Loss is equal to one if the firm’s most recent quarter’s 
income before extraordinary items is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  HorizonSPX is equal to the volatility-weighted duration for the S&P 500 
index option (SPX), measured on the same days as Horizon.  PDCShort (PDCLong) is equal to one if the firm’s industry is classified as having a 
short (long) product development cycle in Bushman et al. (1996), and zero otherwise.  σ365 is the standard deviation of the firm’s daily returns 
over the previous 365 calendar days.  Ln(OpInt) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total open interest of all exchange traded options for that 
firm.  Ln(Vol) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total volume of all exchange traded options for that firm.  StOpInt is equal to the proportion 
of the total open interest in exchange traded options with less than nine months to expiration.  StVol is equal to the proportion of the total volume 
in exchange traded options with less than nine months to expiration.  We measure Ln(OpInt), Ln(Vol), StOpInt, and StVol on the same day as 
Horizon.  t-statistics are presented in parentheses and calculated based on two-way (by 2-digit SIC code and year-quarter) cluster-robust standard 
errors.     
 
 
Variable Predicted  
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Assets) + 0.96 1.02 1.89 1.32 
  (7.08) (6.42) (9.96) (6.17) 
Ln(MB) + 0.76 0.71 1.40 0.75 
  (3.26) (2.89) (6.40) (3.24) 
R&D Ind + 1.27    
  (3.09)    
R&D +  9.49 15.13 14.96 
   (3.86) (8.44) (8.83) 
CapEx  -18.64 -17.43 -4.13 -3.24 
  (-2.39) (-1.90) (-0.48) (-0.40) 
Loss - -1.16 -1.53 -1.48 -0.35 
  (-2.41) (-4.11) (-4.67) (-0.90) 
HorizonSPX + 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 
  (4.66) (4.72) (5.90) (5.86) 
PDCShort - -1.73 -1.67 -0.57 -0.62 
  (-2.78) (-2.71) (-1.05) (-1.36) 
PDCLong + -0.77 -0.90 -0.46 -0.71 
  (-1.16) (-1.26) (-0.85) (-1.54) 
Ln(OpInt)    -0.93 -0.62 
    (-5.18) (-3.87) 
Ln(Vol)    -0.54 -0.45 
    (-5.71) (-4.40) 
StOpInt -   -7.30 -7.29 
    (-4.58) (-4.63) 
StVol -   -2.82 -2.85 
    (-4.81) (-5.02) 
σ365 -    -8.81 
     (-4.04) 
      
Year-quarter fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  .2053 .2060 .2422 0.2570 
N  19,973 19,973 19,973 19,973 
      
t-tests:      
R&D = CapEx   (3.28) (2.27) (2.35) 
PDCLong = PDCShort  (1.84) (1.26) (0.20) (-0.19) 




Regression Analysis of the Term Structure of the Dispersion in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 
 
The dependent variable in (1), AnalystTermSt, is equal to the standard deviation of analyst estimates for the firm’s next fiscal year’s earnings 
scaled by the median estimate for the next fiscal year divided by the standard deviation of analyst estimates for the firm’s current fiscal year’s 
earnings scaled by the median estimate for the current fiscal year.  The dependent variable in (2), Horizon, is equal to a firm’s volatility-weighted 
duration measured 45 days after an earnings announcement.  Ln(Assets) is equal to the natural logarithm of the firm’s most recent quarter’s total 
assets.  Ln(MB) is equal to the natural logarithm of the firm’s market-to-book ratio, which is the firm’s current (45 days after the earnings 
announcement) market value divided by the firm’s most recent quarter’s  book value of shareholder’s equity.  R&D is equal to the sum of the 
firm’s R&D expense for the prior four quarters divided by the most recent quarter’s total assets.  R&D Ind is equal to one if R&D is greater than 
zero, and zero otherwise.  CapEx is equal to the sum of the firm’s capital expenditures for the prior four quarters divided by the most recent 
quarter’s total assets.  Loss is equal to one if the firm’s most recent quarter’s income before extraordinary items is less than zero, and zero 
otherwise.  HorizonSPX is equal to the volatility-weighted duration for the S&P 500 index option (SPX), measured on the same days as Horizon.  
PDCShort (PDCLong) is equal to one if the firm’s industry is classified as having a short (long) product development cycle in Bushman et al. (1996), 
and zero otherwise.  σ365 is the standard deviation of the firm’s daily returns over the previous 365 calendar days.  Ln(OpInt) is equal to the 
natural logarithm of the total open interest of all exchange traded options for that firm.  Ln(Vol) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total 
volume of all exchange traded options for that firm.  StOpInt is equal to the proportion of the total open interest in exchange traded options with 
less than nine months to expiration.  StVol is equal to the proportion of the total volume in exchange traded options with less than nine months to 
expiration.  #AnalystSt is equal to the number of analyst forecasts made during the current quarter for the firm’s current fiscal year earnings.  
#AnalystLt is equal to the number of analyst forecasts made during the current quarter for the firm’s next fiscal year earnings.  t-statistics are 




Variable Predicted Sign (1)  (2) 
Ln(Assets) + -0.01   
  (-0.21)   
Ln(MB) + 0.07   
  (1.54)   
R&D + 1.88   
  (2.79)   
CapEx  1.21   
  (1.69)   
Loss - -0.01   
  (-0.13)   
HorizonSPX + 0.01  0.41 
  (1.52)  (5.58) 
PDCShort - -0.28   
  (-3.67)   
PDCLong + 0.00   
  (0.03)   
σ365 - -0.39   
  (-2.11)   
AnalystTermSt +   0.24 
    (2.72) 
#AnalystSt -   -0.08 
    (-2.42) 
#AnalystLt +   0.05 
    (1.69) 
Ln(OpInt)  -0.04  0.49 
  (-1.32)  (2.06) 
Ln(Vol)  0.02  -0.46 
  (1.47)  (-3.96) 
StOpInt - 0.12  -7.83 
  (1.21)  (-4.85) 
StVol - -0.19  -2.66 
  (-1.56)  (-3.35) 
Year-quarter fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2  0.0531  .1912 




Descriptive Statistics at Earnings Announcement Dates 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th 
Panel A: Conference Call Subsample 
Disclosure Horizon 14,973 180.45 45.09 148.30 179.84 211.09
    
Disclosure HorizonSPX 14,973 153.84 34.30 130.27 151.94 173.24
    
Horizonpre 14,973 178.60 12.94 172.61 180.16 186.04
    
Horizonpre,SPX 14,973 184.70 8.00 181.19 185.65 190.63
    
OpenInt 14,973 10.82 1.51 9.80 10.83 11.82
    
StOpenInt 14,973 -0.28 0.31 -0.36 -0.18 -0.09
    
AnnRet 14,973 0.001 0.074 -0.031 0.002 0.035
    
AnnRet2 14,973 0.006 0.018 0.000 0.001 0.004
    
Forecast Horizon 6,271 4.84 0.77 4.25 5.04 5.48
    
Bundled 14,973 0.42 0.49 0 0 1
    
Conf. Call 14,973 0.24 0.42 0 0 0
    
Bundled*Conf. Call 14,973 0.12 0.32 0 0 0
       
Panel B: Full Sample 
Disclosure Horizon 19,564 180.16 44.74 148.46 179.22 210.43
    
Disclosure HorizonSPX 19,564 155.00 33.52 133.41 154.19 173.76
    
Horizonpre 19,564 178.95 12.49 173.15 180.34 186.08
    
Horizonpre,SPX 19,564 184.29 7.62 180.83 184.80 189.89
    
OpenInt 19,564 10.96 1.45 10.04 10.97 11.90
    
StOpenInt 19,564 -0.26 0.29 -0.33 -0.16 -0.07
    
AnnRet 19,564 0.002 0.078 -0.033 0.001 0.005
    
AnnRet2 19,564 0.006 0.021 0.000 0.001 0.005
    
Forecast Horizon 7,861 4.83 0.79 4.23 5.03 5.48
    
Bundled 19,564 0.40 0.49 0 0 1
       
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of earnings announcements in the conference call subsample (2002 - 2008; 
Panel A) and in the full sample of earnings announcements (2001 - October 2010; Panel B).  Disclosure Horizon is the firm’s 
volatility-change-weighted duration over a three-day window centered on the firm’s earnings announcement date.  Disclosure 
HorizonSPX is equal to the volatility-change-weighted duration for the S&P 500 index option (SPX), over the same three-day 
windows as the firms.  Horizonpre is the firm’s volatility-weighted duration two days prior to the earnings announcement.  
Horizonpre,SPX is the SPX’s volatility-weighted duration two days prior to the earnings announcement.  The implied volatility for 
the first 30 days is excluded from the calculation of Disclosure Horizon, Disclosure HorizonSPX, Horizonpre, and Horizonpre,SPX.  
OpenInt is equal to the natural logarithm of the total open interest prior to the earnings announcement window of all exchange 
traded options for that firm.  StOpenInt is equal to the natural logarithm of the proportion of the total open interest prior to the 
earnings announcement window in exchange traded options with less than nine months to expiration.  AnnRet is equal to the 
firm’s compounded three-day stock return during the earnings announcement window.  AnnRet2 is equal to AnnRet squared.  
Forecast Horizon is equal to the natural logarithm of the average of all the EPS forecast horizons that a firm bundled with an 
earnings announcement.  Forecast Horizon is only calculated for earnings announcements that contained a management forecast 
of EPS.  Each individual forecast horizon is equal to the difference between the end of the fiscal period being forecasted and the 
forecast date.  Bundled is equal to one if the firm issued an EPS forecast within a three day window around their earnings 
announcement date, and zero otherwise.  Conf. Call is equal to one if the firm held a conference call within a three day window 
around their earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise.  Bundled*Conf. Call is equal to one if the firm both issued an EPS 




















(a) Correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level; (b) Correlation coefficient is significant at the 10% level; (c) Correlation coefficient is not significant at the 10% level 
This table presents Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients above (below) the diagonal.  Disclosure Horizon is the firm’s volatility-change-weighted duration over a three-day 
window centered on the firm’s earnings announcement date.  Disclosure HorizonSPX is equal to the volatility-change-weighted duration for the S&P 500 index option (SPX), over 
the same three-day windows as the firms.  Horizonpre is the firm’s volatility-weighted duration two days prior to the earnings announcement.  Horizonpre,SPX is the SPX’s volatility-
weighted duration two days prior to the earnings announcement.  The implied volatility for the first 30 days is excluded from the calculation of Disclosure Horizon, Disclosure 
HorizonSPX, Horizonpre, and Horizonpre,SPX.  OpenInt is equal to the natural logarithm of the total open interest prior to the earnings announcement window of all exchange traded 
options for that firm.  StOpenInt is equal to the natural logarithm of the proportion of the total open interest prior to the earnings announcement window in exchange traded options 
with less than nine months to expiration.  AnnRet is equal to the firm’s compounded three-day stock return during the earnings announcement window.  AnnRet2 is equal to AnnRet 
squared.  Forecast Horizon is equal to the natural logarithm of the average of all the EPS forecast horizons that a firm bundled with an earnings announcement.  Forecast Horizon 
is only calculated for earnings announcements that contained a management forecast of EPS.  Each individual forecast horizon is equal to the difference between the end of the 
fiscal period being forecasted and the forecast date.  Bundled is equal to one if the firm issued an EPS forecast within a three day window around their earnings announcement date, 
and zero otherwise.  Conf. Call is equal to one if the firm held a conference call within a three day window around their earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise.  
Bundled*Conf. Call is equal to one if the firm both issued an EPS forecast and held a conference call within a three day window around their earnings announcement, and zero 























































Horizonpre -0.22 0.02 1.00 0.28 -0.07 -0.11 0.01
(b) -0.11 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.08 
Horizonpre,SPX -0.11 0.01
(c) 0.21 1.00 -0.01(c) -0.02 0.02(a) -0.17 0.08 -0.00(c) 0.07 0.04 
OpenInt -0.04 -0.00(c) -0.07 -0.01(c) 1.00 -0.07 -0.01(c) -0.00(c) -0.04 -0.03 0.10 0.05 
StOpenInt 0.05 0.03 -0.11 -0.01(c) -0.14 1.00 -0.02(b) 0.01(c) 0.02(b) 0.02 -0.03 -0.01(c) 
AnnRet 0.01(c) -0.03 0.02(a) 0.01(b) -0.01(c) -0.03 1.00 0.01(b) 0.02(b) 0.00 0.02(a) 0.00(c) 
AnnRet2 0.05 -0.02(b) -0.17 -0.18 -0.00(c) 0.01(c) 0.03 1.00 -0.02(b) -0.11 -0.05 -0.06 
Forecast Horizon -0.01(c) 0.03(a) -0.10 0.07 -0.02(b) 0.04 0.03(a) -0.06 1.00 N/A 0.01(c) 0.01(c) 
Bundled -0.03 0.00(c) 0.05 0.00(c) -0.03 0.03 0.01(c) -0.16 N/A 1.00 0.10 0.43 
Conf. Call -0.02(a) 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.09 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.02(b) 0.10 1.00 0.67 





Regression Analysis of Disclosure Horizon 
 
The dependent variable, Disclosure Horizon, is equal to a firm’s volatility-change-weighted duration over a three-day window 
centered on the firm’s earnings announcement date.  Forecast Horizon is equal to the natural logarithm of the average of all the 
EPS forecast horizons that a firm bundled with an earnings announcement.  Forecast Horizon is only calculated for earnings 
announcements that contained a management forecast of EPS.  Each individual forecast horizon is equal to the difference 
between the end of the fiscal period being forecasted and the forecast date.  Bundled is equal to one if the firm issued an EPS 
forecast within a three day window around their earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise.  Conf. Call is equal to one if 
the firm held a conference call within a three day window around their earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise.  
Bundled*Conf. Call is equal to one if the firm both issued an EPS forecast and held a conference call within a three day window 
around their earnings announcement, and zero otherwise.  Horizonpre is the firm’s volatility-weighted duration two days prior to 
the earnings announcement.  Horizonpre,SPX is the SPX’s volatility-weighted duration two days prior to the earnings 
announcement.  Disclosure HorizonSPX is equal to the volatility-change-weighted duration for the S&P 500 index option (SPX), 
over the same three-day windows as the firms.  The implied volatility for the first 30 days is excluded from the calculation of 
Disclosure Horizon, Disclosure HorizonSPX, Horizonpre, and Horizonpre,SPX.  AnnRet is equal to the firm’s compounded three-day 
stock return during the earnings announcement window.  AnnRet2 is equal to AnnRet squared.  t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses and calculated based on two-way (by 2-digit SIC code and year-quarter) cluster-robust standard errors.    
 
 
Variable Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3)  
Forecast Horizon + 1.46    
  (1.84)    
      
Bundled   -2.97 -4.27  
   (-3.09) (-3.80)  
      
Conf. Call  3.33  -1.99  
  (2.21)  (-1.72)  
      
Bundled*Conf. Call    5.18  
    (2.71)  
      
Horizonpre - -0.87 -0.77 -0.77  
  (-7.83) (-9.55) (-9.63)  
      
Horizonpre,SPX  -0.54 -0.49 -0.50  
  (-1.51) (-2.26) (-2.26)  
      
Disclosure HorizonSPX  0.01 0.01 0.01  
  (0.47) (0.64) (0.63)  
      
AnnRet + 3.76 14.03 14.19  
  (0.38) (1.98) (2.01)  
      
AnnRet2 - -36.37 -33.17 -34.25  
  (-0.59) (-1.90) (-1.93)  
      
Year-quarter fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  
Adj. R2  0.1200 0.1116 0.1122  






Regression Analysis of Open Interest in Short-term Options 
Variable Predicted Sign (1) (2) 
Forecast Horizon - -0.0138  
  (-2.52)  
    
Bundled +  0.0084 
   (1.84) 
    
Horizonpre - -0.0013 -0.0015 
  (-3.39) (-4.65) 
    
Horizonpre,SPX  0.0019 0.0013 
  (0.57) (0.30) 
    
OpenInt - -0.0147 -0.0154 
  (-3.10) (-3.85) 
    
Year-quarter fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.2489 0.2324 
N  7,861 19,564 
 
The dependent variable, StOpenInt, is equal to the natural logarithm of the proportion of the total open interest prior to the 
earnings announcement window in exchange traded options with less than nine months to expiration.  Forecast Horizon is equal 
to the natural logarithm of the average of all the EPS forecast horizons that a firm bundled with an earnings announcement.  
Forecast Horizon is only calculated for earnings announcements that contained a management forecast of EPS.  Each individual 
forecast horizon is equal to the difference between the end of the fiscal period being forecasted and the forecast date.  Bundled is 
equal to one if the firm issued an EPS forecast within a three day window around their earnings announcement date, and zero 
otherwise.  Horizonpre is the firm’s volatility-weighted duration two days prior to the earnings announcement.  Horizonpre,SPX is 
the SPX’s volatility-weighted duration two days prior to the earnings announcement.  OpenInt is equal to the natural logarithm of 
the total open interest prior to the earnings announcement window of all exchange traded options for that firm.  The implied 
volatility for the first 30 days is excluded from the calculation of Horizonpre, and Horizonpre,SPX.  t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses and calculated based on two way (by 2-digit SIC code and year-quarter) cluster-robust standard errors.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
